30% of households living in single family homes is not insignificant. In the villages outside the large cities there's plenty of space to charge your car at home and an increasing amount of solar on the roof.
Not being able to access the web interface where you have to manually upload a new certificate due to HSTS and the old certificate having expired a couple hours ago...
I've been told that since the privatization, the funding was split between DB paying for maintenance while the state provided funds for replacement and new lines. Allegedly this provided an incentive to let things deteriorate until they needed replacement.
Projects are planned, coordinated and funds allocated far in advance, so if the government can't agree on a budget and projects are shelved or canned, restarting the process causes a significant delay.
To clarify: Deutsche Bahn is still 100% government owned. It operates both its train service and the railroad infrastructure in fully owned subsidiaries.
And that's exactly what's not reflected in management success metrics. They are basically incentivized to steal from their owners through systematic neglect, what could possibly go wrong.
I think it's only possible to understand German politics in two ways: either nobody in politics understands incentives, or they understand incentives much better than the voters and are fully exploiting this fact.
They can, but the list of "if..." and "it depends..." is much longer and complicated, especially when getting to the part how the obtained information may be used
Last time I had enabled RCS I received a flood of "DHL needs your address" and "Mom I have a new phone number" scams from the UK and the Philippines. So far I'm not aware of anything useful I've missed out on by not having it enabled.
-the ID card which trusts the government PKI and has its own private key and certificate
- the application that does some certificate checks and facilitates communication between the card and an eID server
- an eID server which is connected to the PKI and regularly received short lived certificates to present to the card, does revocation checks, validity checks and a bunch of other stuff. Also provides a list of fingerprints of TLS certificates of eID services allowed for the session
- an eID service which opens a session with the eID server indicating requested data and ultimately receives this data from the eID server. They own the legalese certificate of which data they have access to.
- maybe another provider wrapping all this and the required certifications,. compliance and hardware into an easy to use API. But could also all be the same.
It could be argued that the government has influence on the eID server providers - which do the actual communication with the card and are the first to receive the data before passing it on - via access to the necessary PKI, but they're not directly involved in the communication.
The card communicates with an eID server via the app. This server is connected to the PKI and receives a new certificate daily-ish and also has a revocation list of blocked IDs. There's a ridiculous amount of regulation for hosting one yourself, so you get that service from one of the two or three who provide it as a service.
ID data this eID server received from the card is then sent to the eID service that initiated the session, which may either be the entity who needs it, or another service provider who wraps another set of regulation requirements and complex eID server API calls into an easy to use API for their customers.
ID data isn't actually shown to the user in the app unless it's a custom implementation that loops it all the way back from the service provider at the end.
That "small sample of telemetry and spying domains" also contains login pages and update downloads, among others. You're just saying everything Microsoft is telemetry and spying, here are all their domains.
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