"Our failure to understand [the Taliban's] dynamic has had consequences."
There was no "failure to understand". This narrative that Afghanistan was a well-intentioned strategic/tactical failure is utterly misleading. The dynamic reality was very clear to every one involved (who cared to know), from servicepeople to 4-star generals, but the military's culture of careerism and corruption prevented these truths from being publicly acknowledged [1].
I strongly recommend you listen to the two veterans describe the dynamic (try 1.5x speed). It is worth more than a 1000 hours of the bloviating punditry that crowds the airwaves right now.
The gist:
* On the ground: "rebuilding Afghanistan" was a total farce. Major Sjursen (Ret.) describes handing out bags of money to "local contractors" with virtually no oversight. He suspects that the Taliban were among the "contractors" and were benefiting immensely from the inept American policy.
* The US military/political leadership is entirely motivated by optics and self-interest. Virtually every report had to have a positive outlook; publicly recognizing the reality on the ground was forbidden, including using words like "insurgency".
I'm a vet, so maybe you'll listen to me. I served in 2011-2012 over the course of what amounts to two deployments with a Marine Corps unit in Helmand and Nimroz provinces.
> The US military/political leadership is entirely motivated by optics and self-interest. Virtually every report had to have a positive outlook; publicly recognizing the reality on the ground was forbidden, including using words like "insurgency".
I would say this half-thought out. While it is true to some degree, the military is largely beholden to the DOD, State Department, various intelligence agencies and the President. Senior Leaders self interest is staying employed and that is done by appeasing their bosses. If you're going to blame military leaders it's always a good idea to ask, "Where'd they get their orders from?" That may sound like a trope, but it's not.
When I went to Afghanistan I cannot tell you how many times we ran into bad intel on the ground. This makes operations run inefficiently, it causes accidents, it affects morale, etc... This literally because the military had a very difficult time, even then, understanding multi-celled non-central organizations like terrorist cells who were smart enough to insert bad intel where it needed to be.
I heard the President at the time telling the American citizens that we were training troops in Afghanistan, all the while I kept seeing report after report saying that troops are being shot in the back on patrol. Sure, we're training them but they're smoking hash on post because four years of ANA or AP pay is equivalent to a dowery. Most of those people didn't want to be there to save their country, they were there to have a better life. Very different motivations and they certainly play a distinct difference in how you'll serve. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/11/six-us-soldier...
I don't have any concrete thoughts on who to blame, be it generals, Presidents, or government officials. Maybe there is no blame. There's also room in my mind that the Taliban and other terrorist organizations are just formidable, well-equipped, and well-educated foes who use ideology as a viral weapon in areas that lack the defensive resources of opportunity and education to combat them. In purpose they are no different from cartels -- their main export is heroin (https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/72241.htm). It's not only how they fund themselves, but it's how they get rich and garner more power to enable their ideology.
> When I went to Afghanistan I cannot tell you how many times we ran into bad intel on the ground. This makes operations run inefficiently, it causes accidents, it affects morale, etc... This literally because the military had a very difficult time, even then, understanding multi-celled non-central organizations like terrorist cells who were smart enough to insert bad intel where it needed to be.
> I don't have any concrete thoughts on who to blame, be it generals, Presidents, or government officials. Maybe there is no blame. There's also room in my mind that the Taliban and other terrorist organizations are just formidable, well-equipped, and well-educated foes who use ideology as a viral weapon in areas that lack the defensive resources of opportunity and education to combat them.
This feels like a cop-out. If the wealthiest nation with the most powerful military in the world wasn't able to achieve the outcome they wanted, something's gone wrong somewhere. I'm happy to entertain a theory like, maybe the DoD put yes-men at the top, but that still begs the question of what went wrong and why that didn't happen in previous wars. Is our state capacity actually much weaker than it was in previous decades? Is the real problem that the public wasn't committed to the war? Maybe - but in that case why weren't we able to realise that earlier?
Ultimately this shouldn't have happened the way it did. I'm sure there are multiple causes rather than a neat single reason, but something is rotten in the US.
There certainly are multiple things rotten in the US, but a glance at history shows us that this sort of challenge has always been nearly impossible.
Specifically, I'm talking about the challenges faced by a wealthy, technologically superior nation-state seeking to subdue a remote, decentralized coalition of irregular military forces whose fighters can blend in with the general populace when needed.
The birth of the USA was something somewhat similar, with the colonies' "ragtag" army defeating the British.
It's also something the Roman Empire struggled with. They conquered city-states with relative ease, rolling them into their empire with a combination of carrot and stick. Decentralized peoples were often another story.
It's also not like there's a shortage of writings about how Afghanistan is essentially unconquerable, thanks to geography and culture. "Graveyard of empires," indeed.
The amusing thing about Taliban and heroin production and export is that they used to be against it (on religious grounds), and suppressed it very brutally and efficiently.
That is, until we invaded. Then they needed the money, and suddenly it was okay.
It will be interesting to see what happens now. Apparently the official stance is that they're going to suppress it again, but we'll see how that translates to real actions.
Based on your experience, is there any reason to believe that USA military as it currently exists could ever be more successful at achieving military objectives in any similar conflict?
I am probably not qualified to answer that, but I'll give you my take.
The US Marine Corps can do anything it sets its mind to. Marines are an amazing and rare breed of people with a culture to boot. To this day, outside of SOCOM, they are one of the only fighting forces that I know of that continue the legacy, lifestyle, and traditions of a warrior culture. In this capacity, yes, I think if you cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war they will do exactly what they are meant to do with zeal and tenacity.
On the other hand, I think the Marine Corps is bound by tricky circumstances, including in Afghanistan. When guerrilla warfare becomes the standard a uniformed military is at a strategic disadvantage. We are bound to things like the Law of Land and Warfare and the Geneva Convention while the enemy is not. They'll blow up a truck in the middle of a convoy and start firing on your position as you try to rescue your friends from burning alive. They'll plant multi-decompression IED's which explode after having been stepped on multiple times because they know watching your best friend or squad leader getting blown up is a shattering experience. They'll have you chase them through a town, backlaying IED's in buildings that you fought from because they know when they really bring the heat and you retreat that you'll go places that you think you've already cleared as safe. They'll pick fights in crowded markets because they know that having to assess a crowd of targets and picking the wrong target is damning both personally and in PR. They'll send kids to fuck with you, throw rocks at your helmet so you take your eyes off your surroundings -- and they know because the folks at home will ask questions that you won't do anything.
The Taliban, and other groups like them, know that folks back home in America are always watching and forming opinions -- many of them in their favor. They know that the more frustrating they make the war, and the harder and more drawn out they make it the more frustrated the American people become. They don't really need to do much; blow up a bridge here, destroy some cellphone towers, set off a couple IED's in crowded spaces, etc... It's the epitome of slow and steady wins the race.
Can a war be won against such people? I think so. The British beat the IRA into submission and they used most of the tactics the Taliban/ISIS/Al Queda use. The difference is they had popular support and it was much closer to home.
Thanks for the answer. I confess I don't see why any similarly-situated opponent would eschew any of those problematic tactics. If we can't handle those we can't in good conscience go to war.
Your impression of the Northern Ireland peace process seems wildly at odds with my recollection. The various Republican and Unionist groups killed and injured more people than the government did. The Provos forced the other parties to the negotiating table with the Docklands and Manchester bombings, and the resulting Good Friday agreement was approved by 97% of Catholic voters because it established local government and made it possible for Ireland to be reunited based on future votes. IRA was no more "beaten into submission" than Taliban were.
On 9 February 1996 a statement from the Army Council was delivered to the Irish national broadcaster Raidió Teilifís Éireann announcing the end of the ceasefire, and just over 90 minutes later the Docklands bombing killed two people and caused an estimated £100–150 million damage to some of London's more expensive commercial property.[183][184] Three weeks later the British and Irish governments issued a joint statement announcing multi-party talks would begin on 10 June, with Sinn Féin excluded unless the IRA called a new ceasefire.[185] The IRA's campaign continued with the Manchester bombing on 15 June, which injured over 200 people and caused an estimated £400 million of damage to the city centre.[186] Attacks were mostly in England apart from the Osnabrück mortar attack on a British Army base in Germany.[185][187] The IRA's first attack in Northern Ireland since the end of the ceasefire was not until October 1996, when the Thiepval barracks bombing killed a British soldier.[188] In February 1997 an IRA sniper team killed Lance Bombadier Stephen Restorick, the last British soldier to be killed by the IRA.[189]
Following the May 1997 UK general election Major was replaced as prime minister by Tony Blair of the Labour Party.[190] The new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, had announced prior to the election she would be willing to include Sinn Féin in multi-party talks without prior decommissioning of weapons within two months of an IRA ceasefire.[190] After the IRA declared a new ceasefire in July 1997, Sinn Féin was admitted into multi-party talks, which produced the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998.[191][192]
I wouldn't call it bad management. It was just realistic management.
We knew by 2002 we weren't going to turn it into a shining pillar of democracy. The next 19yr were just people covering their asses and biding their time while the American public came around to the same conclusion.
It's kind of like letting your direct reports screw off and job hunt on the job because your all getting laid off but the termination date is next quarter. Not great, but doesn't really matter to the big picture.
> prevented these truths from being publicly acknowledged
To be honest, I'm shocked that people are deluding themselves that anybody ever thought otherwise.
I can't ever remember reading an article in any mainstream news outlet that suggested nation building in Afghanistan was going well. The "peace deal" that Trump signed with the Taliban last year literally assumed the Taliban would quickly takeover the country once the U.S. withdrew, and I don't remember anybody seriously disputing that basic assumption. At best people just ignored thinking about the issue entirely; any American who gave it any serious consideration would have to fend off some serious cognitive dissonance to believe it was going well.
This has been the state of affairs for 5, maybe 10 years, at least. But we live in an age of outrage culture where hoards of people seem to spontaneously develop amnesia whenever there's something to get upset over.
The withdrawal seems to have been problematic, though because of rage culture and collective amnesia it's rather difficult to judge the magnitude of the logistical errs from the press.
That said, the withdrawals were ongoing for years; the U.S. was down to 2500 personnel as long ago as January. Considering that so-called nation-building is an art that no polity has yet cracked, it's not surprising that the U.S. would also fail to foresee how spectacularly they fell short in their endeavor--i.e. that the Taliban would take mere days or even hours, rather than months, to control the country.
And I fail to see how careerism in the military could be blamed for any of this, at least at a strategic level. Again, who the heck believed Afghanistan wasn't a lost cause? Nobody. The occupation was interminable because nobody had the political guts to pull out completely (especially considering rage culture), even though everybody knew full well that the U.S. could never commit more to get the job done (assuming anybody even knew what or how much it would take to get the job done, which in fact nobody did and there was hardly any pretense otherwise, at least not in the past several years).
From afar what i got out of the afghan withdrawal was about the idea that intervening has failed too many times and it would be wise to leave. The local political aftermath was drowned underneath sadly. I also had a misconception that Taliban became mild and would just become the usual conservative semi dictatorship ala Syria or Turkey. Not gunning in crowds in day one.
The impression I’ve gotten from folks that were “over there” recently - including one person who was a contractor serving as embassy security in Kabul and didn’t get out until the second-to-last military flight - is that there are now effectively “two Talibans”.
There’s the main contingent, which is interested in being recognized as the legitimate government of the country and participating on the global stage. They comprise the leadership of the forces that took the major cities and are mostly interested in organizing a working civil authority at the moment.
Then there’s a hardline group. They’re mostly “tribal” leaders and leaders of smaller bands of fighters specifically in rural areas. They’re more similar to the Taliban from before the US invaded; they care little for how things look to the rest of the world and are enforcing their edicts vigorously.
This aligns with what I’ve seen from the outside. Not much seems to be happening in Kabul or Kandahar, but there are videos coming from the outlying areas of door-to-door raids resulting in the executions of “collaborators”.
The fact that we are willing to even call this “nation-building” speaks volumes to how deeply we are penned. Nation-building? Is that what we were doing in Afghanistan? We were there to build a democracy of institutions? Or were we there to pillage a country?
Why don’t we “nation-build” Saudi Arabia? Oh. We are already extracting the wealth? Right.
It simultaneously delegitimizes the current / former government (not "a nation") and casts the outcome in unimpeachable terms (more democracy, more freedom, more nation).
But in a lot of ways, it's a tautology. Because nation building really means "more like us."
And what country would disagree that the rest of the world would be so lucky as to be made more like it?
This is very much what the UN charter is about. Article 2 has always irked me the wrong way. It's basically saying that any member has to support the UN in any action towards non members if it suits their view of peace and security. Which is obviously very vague.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Is that what we were doing in Afghanistan? We
were there to build a democracy of institutions?
Or were we there to pillage a country?
I'm not a fan of the US' occupation of Afghanistan, and I don't think the US was there for some sort of higher ideal... but, pillage? It's not a country from which there is much wealth to extract.
Of course, the US military-industrial complex profited nicely. That's not quite the same as pillaging, though.
Except of course for the Trillion worth of mineral wealth found in 2010[0], that the Afghan government has been spending $300 million per year on(probably to US contractors)[1].
There’s nothing to pillage in Afghanistan except heroin. If there were things would have probably gone better because at least there would have been a point.
Poppy cultivation was serially outlawed, punished, tolerated, encouraged, etc, start again. Different policies came through on a regular basis, with no more reliance on logic or local circumstances than any other USA military policy in Afghanistan. The only constant was that nobody screwed with fields owned by powerful people e.g. Ahmed Wali Karzai.
> The "peace deal" that Trump signed with the Taliban last year literally assumed the Taliban would quickly takeover the country once the U.S. withdrew
Actually, no. Trump's Doha agreement implied a 14 month staged, gradual, condition based withdrawal, with no people or materiel left behind. Which, on top of that, would be aborted if Taliban tried to pull off what they pulled off over the past couple of weeks.
But Trump's Doha agreement would not allow Biden to take credit "by 9/11", so he scrapped it and withdrew haphazardly, without any conditions, leaving thousands of people and billions in materiel behind enemy lines. He owns this now.
It was a screwed up situation with no right answers brought about by cascading events that started long before 9/11. There was no choice but to invade after 9/11, there was no opportunity for victory for the duration, and there were no easy morally right exits for the duration. Generations of honorable and well meaning Americans fought for what they believed was right.
I have my doubts but I truly hope the taliban somehow came out the other side as a more moderate organization. It would be so incredibly amazing to know that half of their massive population would not be oppressed. I will be keeping my fingers crossed but it seems unlikely to me that a battle hardened group like theirs could be anything but hardline and this seems like the perfect thing to say so that no one gets second thoughts about leaving.
There was no "failure to understand". This narrative that Afghanistan was a well-intentioned strategic/tactical failure is utterly misleading. The dynamic reality was very clear to every one involved (who cared to know), from servicepeople to 4-star generals, but the military's culture of careerism and corruption prevented these truths from being publicly acknowledged [1].
[1] - https://youtu.be/_bo7P_podIk