> The reality is that emotions are subjective and we have no way to compare our experiences directly with others, but it's ridiculous to assert that they don't exist.
Or rather, it's the failure to endorse Theory-Theory as an axiom. Plenty of people who don't do that think of this type of introspection as a self-narrative rather than an actual inspection of anything. An Epiphenomenalist might say that beliefs about one's own "emotions" are a retrospective interpretation of instinctive activations of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems.
And they'd have experimental evidence on their side. To believe in emotions without coherent physical expressions or locations can seem like a form of dualism.
Or rather, it's the failure to endorse Theory-Theory as an axiom. Plenty of people who don't do that think of this type of introspection as a self-narrative rather than an actual inspection of anything. An Epiphenomenalist might say that beliefs about one's own "emotions" are a retrospective interpretation of instinctive activations of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems.
And they'd have experimental evidence on their side. To believe in emotions without coherent physical expressions or locations can seem like a form of dualism.