This is what I cited (from the 1983 issue of Air University Review) which makes many similar points but concentrates more on his impact on the organization at the Navy level (https://web.archive.org/web/20130310192210/http://www.airpow...). I also pointed out to him that Rickover didn't think civilian nuclear power should be a thing towards the end of his life as well as some points about the Shoreham plant and the backup turbines.
e: "In time, he became increasingly conservative if not reactionary, putting space between himself and any responsibility for failure or accident. When the USS Thresher was lost in April 1963, he immediately phoned the Bureau of Ships to dissociate himself from any likelihood of failure of the nuclear plant in the incident. The bureau chief thought this action "thoroughly dishonest."
e: "In time, he became increasingly conservative if not reactionary, putting space between himself and any responsibility for failure or accident. When the USS Thresher was lost in April 1963, he immediately phoned the Bureau of Ships to dissociate himself from any likelihood of failure of the nuclear plant in the incident. The bureau chief thought this action "thoroughly dishonest."