A lot of tech people here are obviously unfamiliar with the history of this. They used to use Gmail for nominally unclassified communication. Several years ago they unceremoniously dropped Gmail for all purposes, without much explanation. It was mostly replaced with Signal.
I originally started using Signal almost entirely as a side effect of this transition. It was blessed as a preferred choice of the US intelligence community for unclassified comms many years ago. And a lot of classified comms if we are honest. If you worked in the US government, you needed Signal.
This isn’t a value judgement, just an acknowledgement of reality. Given this, it would be weird if they didn’t have Signal installed.
I can second this, and I'll add that other corners of the bureaucracy also like Signal. From my POV, the interesting part is that the CIA has incorporated Signal into SOP, rather than it being an ad-hoc thing.
It's probably a matter of pragmatism. People are gonna use instant messengers, might as well recommend the least bad one. I've seen it in corporate environments too. If you have locked-down workstations, there's usually some list of free software that isn't officially supported, but doesn't require special approvals.
Yes, the scandal here is not just the questionable security. It is also clear intent to circumvent transparency laws which suggests they may be intending to hide the breaking of other laws.
Using signal with auto deletion is illegal. Creating a fork of Signal for CIA (or whichever) use and then deliberately not removing auto-deletion is really illegal. I think that's the thought process, at least.
Those people should receive administrative reprimands for that, probably up to termination. If they were discussing active strikes, targets, and intelligence sources, then they should probably be indicted.
If history has taught us anything (Hillary), that's just wishful thinking from people without power and political rivals. On rational side, most likely one of their phones got hacked which caused this leak. They are high profile targets after all. At their level, exactly what's the SOPs they must follow otherwise gonna get fired? They may push for policies downstream, but policies that govern them? They can just argue for precedence (Hillary) and nothing gonna come of this.
It was my understanding that after extensive investigation there was found to be no classified material shared on that server - which checks out since emailing classified information is pretty uncommon outside of SIPRNET and the like
I don't know how they would classify gossips, opinions, deals made by a Secretary of State with or regarding the heads of foreign nations. I'm sure it's an "extensive" investigation. Haha. Democrats probably just want to sweep it under the rug, and Republicans want to use it for favors/card in this situation.
This specific desire to not do unnecessary legwork, and lean on the assumptions we already hold, are the teeth of the termites that tear through society and lead to polarization.
It’s not a criticism - I couldn’t be less inclined to go through the actual searches to verify this either way.
This is just the failure state that happens an infinite number of times online every day, across the world.
At some point, the conversations start demanding a level of work that’s beyond what we are willing to put in. I can’t see any real solution for it. (Unless there’s some GAI magic wand for this.)
There is a world of difference between everyday government conversations.
And discussing a country being bombed including exact times, what weapons are being used, locations of US personnel etc. And where one of the members of that group was in Moscow visiting Putin and likely would’ve been using a Russian WiFi network or cellular connection.
No reason, whatsoever, for Signal to be used in this situation.
>No reason, whatsoever, for Signal to be used in this situation.
It sounds like the exact appropriate time to use Signal. It turns out that some high ranking official's jobs involve traveling to unfriendly or hostile countries. They still sometimes need to weigh in on classified communications. It was true back when Hilary was signing off on drone targets through text, and its true today.
There are secure methods of communication that don’t involve public networks.
And don’t forget that the Pentagon was warning that “Russian professional hacking groups are employing the 'linked devices' features to spy on encrypted conversations”
That's quite ridiculous. What about the security of the phone they are using? When Hillary was signing off on drones via text, that was incredibly stupid and it remains true today.
Nothing is binary, everything is a tradeoff. Her texts didn't mention specifics so presumably anyone eavesdropping wouldn't have been able to identify the exact context. It's reasonable for high level officials to weigh the cost vs benefit. When you're one or two steps away from the president, you have a lot of leeway.
Yeah, you don't discuss war planning over an insecure phone. The OP talked about "in this situation", so no, you don't do that. And at least one member of that Signal chat was in Russia.
When you are one or two steps away from the President, you should be even more careful.
There are record retentions laws the very existence of Signal should be a violation. This is why nothing is goin to happen because they are all Breaking THE LAW anytime deletion is on
Signal can be used to arrange meetings, but secret materials like war plans need to be in SCIFs
Everybody that saw that usage of Signal and didn't shut it down should face the normal consequences, in addition to the consequences that a leader undergoes for such terrible decision making.
SCIF is a physical place, not a communications mechanism.
I believe the DoD can use applications in the JWICS suite of tools to communicate up to top secret level information. With the DCS platform for only Secret level communications.
However, these tools are on dedicated networks and dedicated machines. I suspect the reason for Signal usage here is that they were using their personal smartphones, which would never get on the JWICS or DCS networks.
Sending war plans around on signal to mobile phones guarantees that the information is reviewed outside of a SCIF. So what's the significance of pointing out that a SCIF is a place and not a network?
Further, one of the members of the group chat was in Russia at the time, because he's the special envoy to Russia, which means that the communication was likely viewed visually by cameras if he were to open the signal chat on his phone.
It's hard to understand this level of incompetence from supposedly "senior" people that are running our government. I would hope that any company would fire people like this immediately. But because they are politicians, they are apparently unfirable.
(And this is entirely ignoring the only reason we know this is going on, that they added a journalist to the chat, one that they claim is particularly unreliable, further damaging the opsec credibility of the politicians.)
> So what's the significance of pointing out that a SCIF is a place and not a network?
It was a confusing Apples Vs. Oranges comparison. A SCIF and Signal were contrasted with one another, like they were providing the same or similar facilities.
There are permissible chat applications that support Top Secret tier information which is actually akin to Signal (e.g. JWICS, DCS, platforms). A SCIF is a secure place, you still need communications technology to get information to and from different remote secure locations inc. SCIFs to even hold those meetings.
Mostly replying to emphasize the second line part of this that seems to get skipped over in a lot of the discussions
> one of the members of the group chat was in Russia at the time, because he's the special envoy to Russia, which means that the communication was likely viewed visually by cameras if he were to open the signal chat on his phone
One of the members of the Signalgate chat, Witkoff, was in Moscow meeting with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Just after midnight Moscow time, the chat named an active CIA intelligence officer; according to a Telegram post by Sergei Markov, Witkoff and Putin were in a meeting until 1:30 a.m. [1]
Pretty sure one of their phones are hacked... They like to be mobile. SCIF would be counterproductive. After Hillary and this, I think they really need to invest more into a secure mobile comm program...
Seems the government IT security and application training people are subpar to say the least.
I would never have given any body an public app like signal by nature it is breaking the record retention law for ANY government communications.
So guess what? nobody is getting busted or arrested or every user gets busted and arrested. Its like giving monkey's hand grenades'.
I'm not saying this in humor, I'm genuinely curious ... how do they handle Signal's absence of FIPS validation and FedRamp certification? Signal isn't even capable of being FIPS validated, the core cryptography is off NIST piste.
100% agree, as someone subjected to the trials of FedRAMP High and DoD IL-5 audits, how is Signal the go to when there's programs for getting SaaS services approved for unclassified communications already in place. Framed selfishly, why the heck are we even bothering with these frameworks if folks are just yolo'ing messages onto Signal? If we've got to suffer through FIPS-validated crypto, DISA STIGs, etc. shouldn't the messaging platform used at least meet par?
There was a lot of chatter on Bluesky earlier about what devices and systems were and should have been used in this particular case, and whether or not some of the testimony given was truthful or accurate.
This Intercept article I think is a little misleading as it's taking something said in testimony at face value, and not really contextualizing it well. Some of these issues are raised in the piece a bit, but to me it reads a little strangely, like a lot of context and background is missing.
This failure should highlight the primary risk in infosec is always adherence by the human element, not whether you spent an extra $10B on a gov software contractor who checked the right checkboxes.
There are certain times where compliance is waved off for the simple reason that even the enforcers don't comply and no one wants to inconvenience themselves.
In every instance where I've been privvy to government partnerships, the version of the solutions we deployed were modified to meet regulatory standards.
> The practice began during President Joe Biden’s administration and had the official approval of CIA records management officials, Ratcliffe said, as long as “any decisions that are made are also recorded through formal channels.”
There is a tension in the interpretation of text messaging. Is it a written record like an email, which is stored and archived? Or is it more like voice conversation; ephemeral and generally not recorded or archived?
For a long time the default behavior of messaging apps was to just hold onto all messages indefinitely. This led a lot of folks in law enforcement to think of them as permanent written records.
The approach in the quote above treats them more like a voice conversation. Anything of significance should be written down in an official way, even if it originated over messaging.
>Anything of significance should be written down in an official way, even if it originated over messaging.
So in the group chat discussing code word material, who was responsible for making the written record? Perhaps that should have been one of the questions today?
Likewise, if it is true that they are using it on a regular basis at CIA HQ I can pretty much guaranty you that it is being used in a manner that is a substitute for email which would be required to be saved in entirety.
Amazing how the Senate can hold a hearing for something happened yesterday, but are apparently helpless to hold hearing about the dozens of other things that actually impact American's lives like housing, healthcare, etc.
Goldberg is highly respected and has gone on the record to say that it was.
The obvious solution here is that if the Trump administration believe it isn’t classified then they simply need to release the transcript.
And it’s implausible that a chat room with Secretary of State, Defense, VP, National Security Advisor etc discussing the Houthis would not be classified.
A surprise attack in a hostile country, especially one using manned aircraft, is 100% classified, 100% of the time, for plainly evident reasons. Unless they discount that Goldberg knew about this attack in advance, which they have not done, they absolutely broached classified information.
Of course per Goldberg it was much worse. An active intelligence officer was in the chat group. Specific human targets (this was an assassination of members of Houthi) were detailed, as were specific ordnance and weapons used.
We'll see the story change quickly in coming days. Goldberg will release more information -- they say it is unclassified -- and immediately the story will kneejerk that he is a traitor putting the country in danger, or maybe that Trump waved his magic wand and declassified it in real time, etc. It's going to be hard for the cult to keep up with whatever the shifting talking points are.
I see that they've already embraced the "somehow he hacked into the group!" narrative that Waltz has shifted to this evening after previously admitting to erroneously inviting him to the group. Soon Goldberg will have burgled Waltz' house and nefariously added himself.
The attack was not a surprise. The US has been bombing Yemen endlessly, but it fell of the news cycle when this failed to have much of an impact on their blockade of the Red Sea, which was paused only thanks to the cease fire with Gaza/Israel.
Anyhow, after Israel returned to bombing, the Houthis resumed that blockade, and Trump announced plans to continue and escalate such actions and direct another carrier there. Similarly the weapons used are unlikely to have varied - mostly just HARM and TLAMs, perhaps backed by more Hellfires from Predators. And finally the targets are also self evident - Houthi leaders, who we've been regularly targeting throughout this entire thing.
Granted I couldn't tell you the exact time the latest bombs would land, though by cross referencing the time the additional carrier arrived I could have given you a pretty good ballpark!
That is not true. Today at the hearing, the CIA director said there was no classified material. He was questioned if the event was a "huge mistake", and answered "No."
The journalist published the messages. The messages take almost no time to read and are very short.
And if you're gonna lament people lying, at least get your house in order first[1].
>The journalist published the messages.
This is patently false. As of the time of my making this comment, Goldberg has still withheld the messages containing the details of the plan of the attack.
CIA director explained that nothing could have been classified because classification authority rests with the secretaries involved themselves. In the journalists opinion, war plans should be classified. Fortunately, we dont rely on Journalists to make that determination.
Fortunately, good journalists do not harm air missions. Unfortunately, bad journalism creates political illusions.
The journalist said he withheld sensative information that the senate hearing today emphasized was regarding an ongoing investigation, and not about war plans. If the whole government is lying, hopefully the journalist is good and publishes facts instead of opinions
Edit: in your clip, CIA director says 'they characterized it as a mistake', not 'he'.
>The information Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth disclosed in the Signal chat of top Trump national security officials was highly classified at the time he wrote it, especially because the operation had not even started yet, according to a US defense official familiar with the operation and another source who was briefed on it afterward.
>At 11:44 a.m., the account labeled “Pete Hegseth” posted in Signal a “TEAM UPDATE.” I will not quote from this update, or from certain other subsequent texts. The information contained in them, if they had been read by an adversary of the United States, could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel, particularly in the broader Middle East, Central Command’s area of responsibility. What I will say, in order to illustrate the shocking recklessness of this Signal conversation, is that the Hegseth post contained operational details of forthcoming strikes on Yemen, including information about targets, weapons the U.S. would be deploying, and attack sequencing.
...
>According to the lengthy Hegseth text, the first detonations in Yemen would be felt two hours hence, at 1:45 p.m. eastern time. So I waited in my car in a supermarket parking lot. If this Signal chat was real, I reasoned, Houthi targets would soon be bombed. At about 1:55, I checked X and searched Yemen. Explosions were then being heard across Sanaa, the capital city.
Literally guaranteed classified information if even the timeline is accurate: If he knew hours in advance of an upcoming strike, they're busted.
Now maybe Goldberg is just a filthy liar and he's making all of this up. Do you really think that? Do you not think he has receipts?
He never said he had classified information. He said he witheld sensitive information which is related to an ongoing investigation (and not related to Houthi airstrikes).
The hearing today said the messages are not classified, and wouldnt be, given it is a cabinet meeting convo.
They said what was withheld by the journalist was sensative information.
Sensative is not Classified, Classified is not Sensative.
The Sensative material withheld is about an unrelated matter, suggested to be an investigation, supposedly.
Im not sure what faith has to do with it. The media is saying there are classified leaks, but the public leaks arent classified or sensitive. The journalist can publish facts showing classified or sensative information if they want to, but so far the only facts in evidence are no classification occurred.
A US public watchdog is now sueing for action to be taken.
The people in the chat group included Vice President JD Vance, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, various other Trump administration officials and aides and notably Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
As American Oversight lawyers pointed out in their lawsuit Tuesday, Rubio is also the acting archivist of the United States and, as such, “is aware of the violations” that allegedly occurred.
The lawsuit, brought by the watchdog group American Oversight, requests that a federal judge formally declare that Hegseth and other officials on the chat violated their duty to uphold laws around the preservation of official communications.
Those laws are outlined in the Federal Records Act and, according to lawyers for American Oversight, if agency heads refuse to recover or protect their communications, the national archivist should ask the attorney general to step in.
* Advance knowledge of US bombings and action was conveyed to a journalist (who didn't know if this was 'real' until the bombs he read about were dropped at the date, time, and locations he read about (and redacted from his reporting))
* Records of thes chats are not being preserved as required by US law for archives, transparency, etc.
* Diplomatic damage via raw opinions of allies shared.
* Reputational damage .. the USofA is now seen as having a meritless day drinking political hire as DoD head who is clueless about "OpSec" .. etc.
Time will tell how this buttery Signals chat plays out .. it's certainly given many other countries more fuel to ridicule the USofA, it's hard to believe these clowns are our partners in global "intelligence".
I would bet my bottom dollar that Sec Def, Sec State, and CIA director have never planned strikes in a Signal groupchat in any prior administration, including Trump 1.
I'm a little surprised that encrypted voice fits through PSTN. like, logically voice can fit, and encryption shouldn't change message size, but plaintext (plainspeech?) voice over PSTN is/was analog, while the ciphertext is digital. I wonder if the quality suffered.
Serious question: how would it be different if JD etc al used a "proper" secure comms app? Perhaps it would be harder to add a random journalist, but they could still accidentally add the wrong government official (maybe).
Such an app would have access to the DoD global address list in Exchange. It would also encourage a handshake akin to “are you in a place where you can securely talk?” which would have taken the Russian envoy out of the chat.
… but not approved for communicating certain information, such as advance battle plans, no matter to whom that information is communicated; nor communicating any information permitted on that channel to people who should not be included on that channel, such as journalists — and it seems that "accidentally" adding someone who should not be on the channel would be much easier to do in a group-messaging app, as opposed to, say, the Situation Room or some other in-person, secure location.
For posterity, I'm also leaving this here. It's the link to,[1] and HN discussion about,[2] The Atlantic's follow-up story, which discloses essentially the entire chat transcript. Let the readers judge for themselves.
Yes, the problem is not that these people messaged each other on Signal.
It is that they:
1.) Conducted official business in a way seemingly incongruous with federal records keeping laws, and
2.) Discussed classified material using a commercial application that is not approved for classified communication.
I originally started using Signal almost entirely as a side effect of this transition. It was blessed as a preferred choice of the US intelligence community for unclassified comms many years ago. And a lot of classified comms if we are honest. If you worked in the US government, you needed Signal.
This isn’t a value judgement, just an acknowledgement of reality. Given this, it would be weird if they didn’t have Signal installed.