For example a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max.

The 737 Max 7 and 10 had to get a waiver due to not being certified in time by the hard requirement to have one when updating old types. Let alone certifying new types.

> a modern EICAS system is required today, and all modern passenger aircraft have one. Except the 737 Max

Instrumentation. Not airframe.

Boeing’s failure was in trying to make a great airframe compensate for failings in other systems.

It is a lackluster airframe but with an entire workforce certified to fly it and thus it is forced to stay around.

Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified.

> Just look at the anti-ice issues preventing 737 Max 7 and 10 to be certified

Not airframe!

Considering the low ground clearance is one of the major issues of the 737 today (which lead to the whole MAX disaster), you'd have to replace the landing gear, and with that you'd also need to make changes to the airframe itself.

> Considering the low ground clearance is one of the major issues of the 737 today (which lead to the whole MAX disaster)

You’re describing an introduced aerodynamic instability. Not an airframe issue. (Misconfiguring the airframe with non-airframe modifications doesn’t count as an airframe failure.)

Analogy: most Linux kernels are not real time. If I run a non-RT Linux in a real-time use case, that doesn’t make the kernel crap. (You probably used it because it’s popular!) It does mean you used it wrong.

737 Max was fundamentally fucked. But it was fucked because it tried to retain a great and proven airframe with incompatible components. The problem isn’t Boeing producing bad airframes. (787 is also a great airframe.) It’s Boeing integrating terribly.

Missing this distinction misses a critical point about the 737 Max’s failure. (It’s also not necessary to understand it the way an aerospace engineer and pilot might. But then don’t misuse, and then double down on misusing, technical terminology.)

You're just clinging to definition while missing the actual issue.

For the 737 to compete with the A320neo, it required much larger engines.

For those engines to fit, they'd either have to raise the landing gear and redesign the airframe to accommodate the changes (which would be a very different airframe), or they'd have to offset the engines (which massively increases the stall risk and lead to the MAX disaster).

This is not an integration issue. There is no possible way for the 737 to fulfill the needs of the 21st century without becoming an entirely different plane.

Ignore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome!

> Ignore everything that makes the 737 a modern passenger aircraft and it’s awesome!

You’re moving the goalposts because you didn’t understand what an airframe is.

The engine anti ice system are literally generic aerodynamic parts and control systems provided by Boeing.

You know, part of the same assembly causing MCAS to exist.

But that is of course not part of the airframe.

> that is of course not part of the airframe

Correct.

The 737’s airframe’s excellence is the reason Boeing was loath to let it go. It’s a really good airframe, and a market fit to boot for the transition from hub and spoke. A clean-sheet design for the 737 would look a lot like the 737. That is what makes the shortcuts tempting.

Engines, avionics and control software are distinct components and not part of the airframe. (Debatable only on engine cowlings and mounts. Neither of which were relevant to the 737 Max’s faults.)