No. It's mostly on device, and the not on-device stuff uses incredibly clever computer science to run code in an auditable, non trackable way on cloud hardware. It's called "Private Cloud Compute" https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute/
That’s overstating what happened there and what was sent. OCSP validation happened only for signed executables and the only bit of information is the hash of the developer certificate being verified, which was not logged in conjunction with your IP.
Apple knows that a Mac user checked the revocation status of the TOR Project’s signing key. They don’t log your IP, your Mac caches the result so it’s not even every time you launch the browser, and if knowing when your browser was launched is a successful timing attack it means the TOR protocol is too broken to be used – which I rather doubt is true regardless of what random commenters may confidently assert.
If the App is delivered outside of the Mac App Store, then you could just verify the signature, then resign / replace it with a local one (using the "codesign" tool). Dealing with OTA updates after you've done this might take a bit more effort.
Resigning will appease Gatekeeper. As a result there will be no X.509 compliant OCSP checks made for the developer certificate - because it won't be there any more.
The Tor browser folks could do this as a privacy and security feature for you.
